AWE

AWE operate two sites near Reading where they support the UK nuclear deterent programme.

Two consequence reports have been published on the internet.
Burfield and Aldermaston in addition the paper written for consideration by the local authority is available on the internet. An excellent interactive map can be found here

The Burghfield report recommends that the proposed minimum geographical extent to be covered by the Local Authorities Off-Site Emergency plan is an area extending to a radial distance of 3160m from the Burghfield Site centre location which compares with the old DEPZ of 1.3 - 2.1 km from the site.

For Aldermaston the new advice is for a minimum DEPZ of 1540 m from the Aldermaston Site centre location compared to the old 2 km - 3.5 km.

It is maybe a bit strange that the same process applied to two sites can produce an apparent increase in one site and reduction in another.

Barrow

BAE Systems Barrow is a manufacturing and design facility for nuclear-powered deterrent and hunter-killer submarines.

The BAE Operator Consequence Report is available here and the Royal Navy's Consequence Report for Ramsden Dock Operational Berth here.

The former states that "the proposed minimum geographical extent from the premises to be covered by the local authority’s detailed emergency plan is an area extending to a distance of 690 m from the Wet Dock Quay, Devonshire Dock Complex, Barrow-in-Furness (Grid Reference SD 19419 68822). This distance aligns with ONR's previous determination of the off-site emergency planning area"

The current public information, with a map of the DEPZ, is available here

Berkeley

In the past the this site was operating as a nuclear power station that generated electricity for 27 years.

The site stopped operating in 1989 and since them has been in a decommissioning phase. There is no longer any radioactive fuel onsite. The 310 tonne boilers have been disposed of and both reactors have been entered into a safe store state.

The Berkeley Consequence Report is available here . It states that the site has no candidate REPPIR accidents and therefore no off-site plan is required.

Capenhurst

Capenhurst is a uranium enrichment site operated by Urenco. It uses centrifuge technology and holds significant stocks of Uranium Hexafloride, representing a chemo-toxic hazard as well as a radiation hazard.

The report on the REPPIR-19 DEPZ determination by the local authority can be found here . This is defined by a number of roads which ring the site beyond the 800 m distance recommended by the operator.

The outline planning zone is the default 5 km.

The consequence report can be found here.

Public information here.

Devonport

Devonport contains a nuclear licensed site (DRDL) and a nuclear authorised site (HMNB). The consequence reports can be found here (DRDL) and here (HMNB). Unsurprisingly, since the major accident risk comes from operating submarine cores, the hazards and distances for urgent protective actions are the same as for the operational berths.

An outline planning zone exists for the site and for a couple of buoys here

The off-site plan can be found here
Public information here.

Dounreay

Dounreay in Caithness was the UK's centre of fast reactor research and development from 1955 until 1994 and is now being decommissioned and cleaned up.

The Dounreay and Vulcan off-site plan can be found here .

Information for those in the OPZ can be found here

Dungeness B

Dungeness B is an EDF Advanced gas cooled reactor site in Kent. It has a decommissioning Magnox reactor site next door that does not have a REPPIR plan.
The local authority discussion report can be found here and their record of decision here.

In the CR EDF recommended a minimum DEPZ extent of 1 km. The council decision report states that: "these discussions concluded that the current 2.4 km DEPZ was the most practical layout to administer and that stakeholders, including local residents, were familiar with this established configuration".

Basically the decision made is the path of least resistance. Will PHE consider this to be an "excessively large area" (Guidance paragraph 197)?

Public information available here.

Hartlepool

Hartlepool is an EDF Advanced gas cooled reactor site in Cleveland.
The EDF consequence report (here) recommends that the DEPZ be no smaller than 2 km from the centre point of the two reactors. The revised DEPZ agreed by the local authority (here) extends for approximately 2.7 km from the site. The New DEPZ area now includes 6 COMAH sites as well as the industrial estates of Graythorpe, Tofts Farm East and West and 1 residential property. The boundary of the DEPZ reflects physical features such as roads, rail, footpaths and geographical boundaries.

The DEPZ public information leaflet can be found here.
The OPZ public information leaflet can be found here.

Hinkley Point B

The CR is available here. A great deal of information about how this was produced is presented in a EDF report (here). The CR recommends and DEPZ of 1 km and for the taking of stable iodine and shelter to be implemented in this area as soon as practical after the declaration. This compares to the current DEPZ of 3.5 km, which is a hang over from the Magnox station at Hinkley Point A. The local council have responded (here). "Whilst Somerset County Council accept the technical assessments provided, we believe any rationale for future arrangements regarding radiation emergencies must include the views of local communities. As such, no reduction will be made to the current arrangements unless the will to do so is widely expressed by those communities within the current detailed emergency planning zone, up to 3.5km from the site"

Given the news that Hinkley Point B is to cease generation by July 2022 (here) this may not happen until shutdown.

It is maybe surprising that the ONR and PHE seem content with a DEPZ that is about ten times the area it should be.

Heysham

Heysham is an EDF Advanced gas cooled reactor site in Lancaster. It comprises Heysham I and Heysham II, each with two reactors.

The REPPPIR-19 documents are available here

The revised DEPZ was agreed by Lancashire County Council on 5 March 2020 and is based upon the recommendations contained within the EDF Energy Consequences Report. The DEPZ is approximately a distance of up to 2.3km from the site.

Hunterston A

Hunterston A is a decommissioning Magnox site in Ayrshire. It is a surprise to see it a consequence report for the site, but it recommends that no off-site plan is required for the site, which is no surprise.

The CR discusses the possibility of a member of the public receiving doses above the lower ERL for shelter in the event of a large aircraft crash onto one small facility on site. The company make the credible claim that this is very unlikely and that the resulting smoke would probably cause the public to withdraw.

CR available here.
OPZ information to public here

Hunterston B

Hunterston B is an EDF Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor site in Ayrshire. The consequence report from EDF can be found here

EDF recommend that "The Detailed Emergency Planning Zone for the site be no smaller than 2 km from the centre point noted". They also recommend the urgent protective actions of stable iodine and shelter out to this distance, to be implemented "as soon as is practical". The assessments indicate evacuation is justified within 300 m, but since most of this is on-site a detailed plan for urgent implementation is claimed not to be justified.

EDF also recommend that food controls be placed within 24 hours for a distance of 43 km downwind.

The Council have agreed that they would "retain the status quo that the boundary of the DEPZ for Hunterston B should include all properties currently within the DEPZ" (here). The result is a 2 km DEPZ with some lumps and bumps.

OPZ information is found here

The off-site plan is here.

Navy Operational Berths

Operational Berths are those berths that have been approved for the use of Nuclear Submarines.

The consequence report for Portland can be found (here). The CRs for all the other OBs are likely to be near identical.

The recommendation is for a 1.5 km DEPZ centred on each berth.

The prompt protective actions recommended are:
a. 200 m from the submarine in all directions - controlled evacuation of the immediate area around the submarine.
b. 400 m from the submarine in all directions – personnel to shelter indoors within the first few hours.
c. 1.5 km from the submarine in the downwind sector - provision and consumption of stable iodine tablets (SITs) within the first few hours.
d. 1.5 km from the submarine in the downwind sector - sheltering indoors within the first few hours

It is recommended that the declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency by the operator to the local authority is the trigger for implementing the off-site emergency plan and initiating all of the above recommended urgent protective actions.

Portland no change to DEPZ (here).

Clyde CR here. Clyde off-site plan (HM Naval Base Clyde and the Faslane, Coulport and Loch Goil Berths) here.

Loch Goil - DEPZ 1.5 km circle with one lump to the north here.
Faslane - DEPZ 1.5 km circle with lumps and bumps here.

Southampton - DEPZ 1.5 km with lumps and bumps (no change) here.
Off-site plan (2018)(shared with portsmouth) here.


Portsmouth DEPZ covers three areas of roughly 1.5 km in radius, including parts of both Portsmouth and Gosport here.
Off-site plan (2018) (Shared with Southamption) here.
Public information here.

Rolls Royce Submarines

Rolls Royce submarines has two Nuclear Licensed Sites at Raynesway on the outskirts of Derby, the Neptune Site and the Nuclear Fuel Production Plant (NFPP) site. Their consequence report can be found here

The recommendation is for a DEPZ of at least 330m from some identified points on site leading to a "lobe shaped zone", as shown in the figure above taken from the CR. In addition an outline planning zone of 1 km has been specified by the Secretary of State for Defence in accordance with regulation 9(1)(c).
The recommended minimum area is smaller than the preceding DEPZ.

Sellafield

The consequence report can be found here. A distance of 5.3 km is recommended for the minimum geographical extent for detailed emergency planning around the Sellafield nuclear licensed site based on a severe earthquake affecting the site.

Current public information found here.

Information for those in the OPZ can be found here

I have not yet found the reason for the increase from 5.3 km (CR) to 7.4 km + bumps (DEPZ). It is probably to do with enclosing populations near to the boundary.

Sizewell B

The consequence report from EDF can be found here and the PHE response to it here.

EDF recommend that "The Detailed Emergency Planning Zone for the site be no smaller than 1350 m from the centre point noted". They also recommend the urgent protective actions of stable iodine and shelter out to this distance, to be implemented "as soon as is practical". The assessments indicate evacuation is justified within 250 m, but since most of this is on-site a detailed plan for urgent implementation is claimed not to be justified.

It is reported (here) that PHE had correspondence with EDF and at least one meeting in support of its review of the EDF CR and leading to the conclusion that "PHE are confident that the application of the Emergency Reference Levels in deriving the recommended distances is correct." The PHE report states that the indicated distance for shelter is 500 m but that "where practical the minimum technical distance for the implementation of sheltering and stable iodine prophylaxis should be the same". It may be sensible at the planning stage not to have different protective actions at different distances but even that is debatable, you may be advising someone at, say, 1200 m to shelter when you suspect that it is likely to avert less than the lower ERL for shelter - how do you justify this? Whatever you think about that, EDF should not be closing done the debate in the technical document. EDF's duty was to report the distances suggested by purely technical arguments.

The council discussion paper and the decision can both be found here.

The decision was:
a) the Sizewell Detailed Emergency Planning Zone as set out in Appendix A (solid blue line).
b) that the revised Sizewell off site emergency planning arrangements should include:
i) sufficient detail to fully implement evacuation to 4kms (2.5mile) or shelter and/or stable iodine tablets to 15km (9.3 mile) within 12 hours of a radiation emergency being declared (the current Extended Emergency Planning Zone); and
ii) sufficient detail to allow evacuation or shelter and stable iodine to begin being implemented up to 30km (18.6 mile) within 24 hours of a radiation emergency being declared (the new Outline Emergency Planning Zone);

Sizewell Off-site plan (2018) here.

Springfields

At Springfields Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) is produced following a number of chemical processes in two sets of rotary kilns and a fluidised bed reactor. HF and F are used as feed gases in these processes introducing some other hazardous materials into the process.

The consequence report from Springfields can be found here. This recommends "Sheltering within the DEPZ to protect against addition ionisation from a criticality in accordance with the lower ERL for shelter of 3 mSv."

The DEPZ is defined as a land area that varies from approximately 300 metres to 1.4 km from the boundary of the Springfield’s Fuels Ltd. site, which is defined by roads, footpaths, field boundaries and waterways. The area includes the villages of Lea Town and Clifton. The council decision is posted here.

The REPPIR prior information for those in the DEPZ is posted here and the REPPIR prior information for the OPZ here.

Torness

The consequence report from EDF can be found here.

EDF recommend that "The Detailed Emergency Planning Zone for the site be no smaller than 2 km from the centre point noted". They also recommend the urgent protective actions of stable iodine and shelter out to this distance, to be implemented "as soon as is practical". The assessments indicate evacuation is justified within 300 m, but since most of this is on-site a detailed plan for urgent implementation is claimed not to be justified.

This compares with the current 3 km DEPZ as shown in the 2019 off-site plan (here).

EDF also recommend that food controls be placed within 24 hours for a distance of 43 km downwind.
Not yet found council decision or new off-site plan.

Wylfa

An ONR report here reports that the site is fuel free and has confirmed to the regulator that it considers that REPPIR-19 no longer applies to its operations on site and that no duties fall on its local authority.

ONR have accepted this. Henceforth Wylfa will have no DEPZ.

How does the Wylfa DEPZ cease to exist if an ONR PAR states that it does exist under REPPIR 2001 and the site does not have to submit a CR under REPPIR-19 for the new duty holders, the local authority, to consider and decide that one is not needed?