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IOP Publishing have just published a Book Review of mine in Journal of Radiation Protection.
I think that this NEA report provides a useful contribution to the protective actions discussion and should be widely read within the industry, relevant local authorities, government bodies and regulators.
To whet their appetite they could start with my review.
The NEA Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Dashboard offers a comprehensive assessment of global progress in SMR development, focusing on seven key dimensions: technical readiness, licensing, siting, financing, supply chain, engagement, and fuel.
The second edition of the Dashboard evaluates 56 SMR designs worldwide, highlighting significant advancements toward deployment and commercialization in both NEA and non-NEA member countries.
SMRs are characterized by their smaller size, typically producing up to 300 MWe, with some designs as small as 1-10 MWe. They are designed for modular manufacturing, factory production, portability, and scalability, offering potential benefits in safety, operational flexibility, economics, and waste management.
The Dashboard reveals substantial progress in SMR deployment, with a subset of designs in advanced stages of commercialization. The first SMRs are expected to be operational within this decade, with accelerated global deployment anticipated in the 2030s.
The report also shows what a crowded market the SMR world has become.
For more detailed information, the full report is available on the OECD-NEA website at https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_90816/the-nea-small-modular-reactor-dashboard-second-edition
ONR’s new document Safety Culture: Definition and Model (2024)[1] “introduces the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR) definition and model of safety culture. Its purpose is to create a collective understanding of safety culture across Great Britain’s nuclear industry to improve organisational learning, and to provide ONR with a simple and straightforward way to engage with those that we regulate on this important topic”.
Safety culture has been defined as that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance (INSAG-4, 1994).
The NISCI is a research-driven tool[2] that evaluates safety culture across nuclear organisations. Its foundation lies in the IAEA’s Harmonised Safety Culture Model, adapted to the specific needs of Great Britain’s nuclear sector through input from all UK licensees. It focuses on identifying and improving underlying attitudes, behaviours, and values related to safety.
It presents a theoretical model based on the work of Schein (1985) and others which has 6 dimensions and 16 sub-dimensions. “The model differentiates between the underlying foundations of culture, in terms of policies, processes, training, and communications, which organisations have in place to support the safety culture, and the elements of the culture which reflect the underlying values, beliefs, and attitudes towards safety”.
The 6 dimensions are:
For each of the 6 dimensions the ONR provides a few “attributes” (or “sub-dimensions) that it looks for and the summary of what bad and what good looks like.
In this the mechanism is rather like the IAEA 2020 Working Document “A Harmonized Safety Culture Model”.[3] This gives us a definition of ‘safety’ is “the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks” (which seems excessively focussed on radiation whereas, I suspect, more people are hurt by slips, trips and falls).
The research paper reports the results of a consultation involving 3,480 workers from 15 nuclear duty holders. It concludes that the scores are high, reflecting the high standard of safety in the GB’s nuclear industry.
ONR highlights the importance of continuous improvement in these areas, advocating for clear communication, consistent leadership actions, and worker engagement to strengthen safety performance and outcomes.
I expect we will see this take life as a periodic questionnaire distribution and comparison of results from site to site and from time to time. But a strong safety culture isn’t just about compliance—it’s about fostering a proactive environment where safety is part of every decision. Tools like NISCI help organisations benchmark their performance, identify gaps, and create tailored improvement plans. This is particularly valuable in building public trust and ensuring operational excellence.
See also
NRC 2004 Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
WANO PRINCIPLES Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture May 2013
[1] https://www.onr.org.uk/media/g3jhg5nt/safety-culture-definition-and-model-issue-1.pdf
[2] https://www.onr.org.uk/media/kajllz4y/ambs-onr-nisci-report.pdf
[3] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/05/harmonization_05_05_2020-final_002.pdf
I listened to a very interesting talk organised by the Emergency Planning Society, a Lunchtime Learning Session – Plymouth Unexploded Ordinance Device Incident.
A 500 kg unexploded bomb from an air raid between 28th and 29th April 1941 was found when digging out the foundations for a house extension.
The on-call emergency responder took the initial call just before 11 am and at 13.30 the Police declared a Major Incident. An initial 214 m evacuation cordon was put in place with the National mobile phone warning system used in anger for the first time and teams from multiple organisations going door to door. The zone evolved with time.
More than 4,200 properties were evacuated involving more than 10,300 people. While many made their own arrangements more than 1000 attended Rest Centres over the three days and more than 1000 calls were received on the 24/7 helpline and 73,000 hits on the website.
The bomb was later moved and destroyed at sea. The move entailed a temporary evacuation of the area either side of the route.
Of particular interest:
A few people were reluctant to leave their homes. Major concerns seemed to be about pets (RSPCA helped) although there were some health issues to manage. These all take resources to work through.
There is a reluctance to use gyms for overnight stays. Preference is to put people up in B&Bs or hotels.
The National Emergency Notifier System worked well with the message out within 30 minutes of the decision to use it. With prepared messages this could be speeded up. Unsurprisingly the system “leaks” in that the message is received beyond the intended footprint so it is important to consider the wording of the message – not “please evacuate” but “please evacuate if you are in this area”.
The council rejigged their “when are my bins emptied” website to show the intended evacuation area in detail. Which was a quick process. Well done Council GIS team.
The area followed the REPPIR process of zigzagging along streets rather than cutting through lines of houses. Good practice.
The local football ground was used as a briefing centre for the boots on the ground.
Supply of sand was successful but not needed in the end (If bomb had been detonated in-situ it would have been surrounded by sand to manage the explosion).
Vulnerable people were identified by door knockers rather than by comparison of agency lists. This was not what the plan expected.
A very interesting talk about the day in a life of a council emergency responder and a good example of multiple agencies working together well. The response would probably not have been so successful without the careful planning and exercising that takes place.
Links
Sheltering in place is thought to be an effective protective action in the case of releases of radioactive dusts and gases from nuclear sites because it reduces gamma radiation dose by a combination of shielding and distance and it reduces the inhalation dose while the airborne levels are higher outside than in. If you are going to stay in shelter for any length of time with elevated external levels it is obviously better to reduce air exchange between the inside and outside.
The UK national advice on the topic has “Key factors affecting the effectiveness of sheltering-in-place include: the air permeability of a building used for shelter; the meteorological conditions; the particle size distribution; the effectiveness/timing of opening windows and doors; and the release duration, all of which could vary significantly from one scenario to another (or even within a single scenario). Some of these factors such as meteorological conditions are time dependent, and therefore the DRF may vary as a function of time.” (PHE-CRCE-049)
Advice to the public in the UK is provided by REPPIR Prior Information leaflets and websites for those near to nuclear sites. These tend to have the advice to close doors and windows and will then say something about other steps that can be taken to reduce air exchange. Examples:
Barrow: “Switch off fans, heating systems, air conditioning and put out open fires”.
Capenhurst: “Switch off all heating systems. Ventilation fans and air conditioning systems to avoid drawing in outside air”.
Devonport: “Put out fires and boilers and shut off air conditioning units. Fans, air conditioning units, boilers, gas fires and heating systems draw in air from outside. You should switch off these things (and damp down open fires) to stop radioactive material from outside coming inside”.
EDF sites “close all outside doors and windows, switch off any ventilation or extractor fans”. [No mention of heating!]
AWE “Turn off boilers and air conditioning units and put out fires or woodburners. Fans, heating systems, boilers, gas fires and air conditioning all draw in air from outside so these should be shut down to minimise radioactive particles entering buildings”.
While the physics suggests that air exchange between the outside world and the inside of a building is affected by the temperature difference most of the historic concern, I suspect, is with systems that burn hydrocarbons in-situ and are designed to draw in air to support combustion. Not everybody uses such systems these days.
Are there forms of heating that we can use safely while in shelter – electric panel convection heaters or air source heat pump serving underfloor or ceiling mounted fan coil units that don’t obviously rely on external fresh air or do we all have to freeze while waiting for the all-clear or evacuation instructions?