The NEA Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Dashboard offers a comprehensive assessment of global progress in SMR development, focusing on seven key dimensions: technical readiness, licensing, siting, financing, supply chain, engagement, and fuel.
The second edition of the Dashboard evaluates 56 SMR designs worldwide, highlighting significant advancements toward deployment and commercialization in both NEA and non-NEA member countries.
SMRs are characterized by their smaller size, typically producing up to 300 MWe, with some designs as small as 1-10 MWe. They are designed for modular manufacturing, factory production, portability, and scalability, offering potential benefits in safety, operational flexibility, economics, and waste management.
The Dashboard reveals substantial progress in SMR deployment, with a subset of designs in advanced stages of commercialization. The first SMRs are expected to be operational within this decade, with accelerated global deployment anticipated in the 2030s.
The report also shows what a crowded market the SMR world has become.
ONR’s new document Safety Culture: Definition and Model (2024)[1] “introduces the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR) definition and model of safety culture. Its purpose is to create a collective understanding of safety culture across Great Britain’s nuclear industry to improve organisational learning, and to provide ONR with a simple and straightforward way to engage with those that we regulate on this important topic”.
Safety culture has been defined as that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance (INSAG-4, 1994).
The NISCI is a research-driven tool[2] that evaluates safety culture across nuclear organisations. Its foundation lies in the IAEA’s Harmonised Safety Culture Model, adapted to the specific needs of Great Britain’s nuclear sector through input from all UK licensees. It focuses on identifying and improving underlying attitudes, behaviours, and values related to safety.
It presents a theoretical model based on the work of Schein (1985) and others which has 6 dimensions and 16 sub-dimensions. “The model differentiates between the underlying foundations of culture, in terms of policies, processes, training, and communications, which organisations have in place to support the safety culture, and the elements of the culture which reflect the underlying values, beliefs, and attitudes towards safety”.
The 6 dimensions are:
Reporting – Focused on fostering a sense of safety, confidence, and informed compliance.
Senior Leadership – Encompassing communication, consistency, and openness about safety.
Line Management – Addressing communication, consistency, and receptiveness at the managerial level.
Challenge – Encouraging a questioning attitude and attentiveness to weak signals.
Accountability – Promoting a “just culture” where accountability is constructive.
Immersion – Relating to employees feeling valued and engaged in safety efforts.
For each of the 6 dimensions the ONR provides a few “attributes” (or “sub-dimensions) that it looks for and the summary of what bad and what good looks like.
In this the mechanism is rather like the IAEA 2020 Working Document “A Harmonized Safety Culture Model”.[3]This gives us a definition of ‘safety’ is “the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks” (which seems excessively focussed on radiation whereas, I suspect, more people are hurt by slips, trips and falls).
The research paper reports the results of a consultation involving 3,480 workers from 15 nuclear duty holders. It concludes that the scores are high, reflecting the high standard of safety in the GB’s nuclear industry.
ONR highlights the importance of continuous improvement in these areas, advocating for clear communication, consistent leadership actions, and worker engagement to strengthen safety performance and outcomes.
I expect we will see this take life as a periodic questionnaire distribution and comparison of results from site to site and from time to time. But a strong safety culture isn’t just about compliance—it’s about fostering a proactive environment where safety is part of every decision. Tools like NISCI help organisations benchmark their performance, identify gaps, and create tailored improvement plans. This is particularly valuable in building public trust and ensuring operational excellence.
See also
NRC 2004 Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
WANO PRINCIPLES Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture May 2013
This report discusses the emergency preparedness we may wish we had put in place if we find ourselves responding to a severe nuclear accident that has resulted in very high doses to some members of the public and has rendered some areas uninhabitable and others problematic. It argues that in that situation you need mature systems to share complex information with individuals and communities, the ability to retain their trust and allow them to make important life-choices while also having in place polices and resources to support the business, social and family life in areas blighted by radioactive contamination. It then discusses the problem in some depth and with clarity while skating over the difficultly with providing solutions.
This publication updates and supersedes Publications 109 and 111. It also supersedes the recommendations published previously in Publications 40, 63, and 82.
The executive summary starts “Large nuclear accidents result when there are significant releases of Radioactive material into the environment, impacting widespread areas and affecting extensive populations. They are unexpected events that profoundly affect individuals, society, and the environment. They generate complex situations and legitimate concerns, particularly regarding health, for all those affected by the presence of undesirable sources of radioactivity”.
I wonder if the use of “legitimate concerns” is fully justified. The two big accidents we all know about, Chernobyl and Fukushima, have had societal and individual impacts well beyond those suggested by our understanding of harm radiation causes to living tissue. It is either the unreasonable concerns about radiation that are causing the problems or our understanding of radiation and the basis of our use of the art of radiological protection in emergency planning that is faulty.
Interestingly the executive summary also states “The Commission recommends that plans should be prepared in advance to avoid severe and long-term consequences following a nuclear accident. Such preparedness plans should comprise a set of consistent protective actions, adapted to local conditions at nuclear sites, taking into account the societal, environmental, and economic factors that will affect the impact of the accident and its response”. I believe that this is suggesting that you go beyond the preparation to rapidly introduce shelter, evacuation and thyroid blocking and that you use locally set trigger points rather than the national ERLs.
The Commission see the response to a large nuclear accident in three phases and relate them to exposures situations thus:
Figure 1 Phases and exposure situations
The report states that a “Large nuclear accidents affect all dimensions of individual and social life” with concern about the health effects of radiation being the major concern but the situation is complex and includes “social, psychological, environmental, educational, cultural, ethical, economic, and political factors associated with the consequences of the accident”. It asks for particular attention to be paid to the needs of “some vulnerable groups, particularly pregnant women, children, people with regular/ specific medical care, and elderly people”.
You could argue that the wide range of impacts listed above would not occur if it were not for the contamination and the concern about health effects. Do you tackle the excessive concern or the results of that concern? In the real world, you probably need to do both.
The report takes a couple of pages to review the effects of radiation on human health.
On societal consequences it opens with “The sudden presence of radioactive contamination is perceived as undesirable, illegitimate, and dangerous, and generates a desire to get rid of it. This presence in the living environment of humans profoundly upsets the well-being of individuals and the quality of life of affected communities. It raises many questions, concerns, and fears; generates numerous views; and worsens conflicts. Some residents will choose to stay in affected areas, when this is allowed, and others will leave. Among those who leave, some will return and others will relocate permanently. This can significantly affect community life and demographics, with a notable decrease in the number of inhabitants, especially young people, as illustrated after the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents”.
And later “Beyond the widespread fear of radiation in all sectors of the population, sociological studies have also revealed: a collapse of trust in experts and authorities; disintegration of families and social ties; apprehension about the future, particularly for children; and a progressive feeling of loss of control over everyday life. All of these consequences affect the well-being of people and pose a threat to their autonomy and dignity”.
The negative image of the affected areas, a reluctance to visit and a rejection of the people living there and any goods produced there continuous to blight the affected area and constrain social dynamics.
The economic impacts can be profound. Local agriculture is likely to suffer. Radiological contamination may affect critical infrastructure. All this has an impact on local businesses and employment, as well as key public services such as government services, security institutions, medical facilities, financial systems, public health services, and education facilities. For local companies their staff, workplaces, products, and image can all be affected. Change in the local demography, as the young and anxious abandon the area, is another factor influencing the overall economy of affected areas.
People are destabilised by the complexity of the situation, both in the immediate response and in the longer term and may have many questions. “People affected by a nuclear accident can feel anguish, dismay, discouragement, helplessness, dissatisfaction, frustration, and anger. Many affected people report feeling a lack of control over their individual living and working conditions, and this is linked to a high level of psychological stress”. This can result in psychological and psychosomatic disorders.
Almost as an aside the report states that “Studies reported an elevated rate of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder among the responders who were directly confronted by the disaster scene, potentially inducing a threat to their lives”. I think the report could have aided clarity by better splitting the discussion about responders from that about affected members.
“Studies have also reported that people who are confronted with radioactive contamination in their daily lives, even if only a small amount, and evacuees facing poor living conditions with no clear view about their future are more vulnerable to anxiety, stress, and depression”.
Parents with young children, especially those in contaminated areas, are particularly vulnerable to anxiety with negative impact on their health and the on the family unit.
Change in lifestyle and reduced circumstances are also stressors.
Experience has shown that “shortly after an evacuation, vulnerable populations such as patients in hospitals and the elderly in care homes are particularly susceptible to hypothermia, dehydration, and the worsening of pre-existing conditions. These can lead to increases in mortality. Meanwhile, children living in evacuation centres are more prone to infectious diseases due to overcrowding and stress caused by inadequate facilities. They can also be affected psychologically, with the subsequent development of emotional problems. Verbal abuse and bullying of evacuated children can form an additional source of stress”.
“In the intermediate and long-term phases, those who remain in the contaminated areas, as well as those subject to temporary relocation, can experience a range of long-lasting physical health effects due to their changes in lifestyle, including obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular and circulatory diseases, hypertension and chronic kidney disease due to poor diet (e.g. lack of fruit and vegetables), lack of exercise, substance abuse, and restricted access to medical facilities or opportunities to seek treatment. Furthermore, restrictions on outdoor play due to the presence of radiation can lead to higher levels of obesity in children”. None of these effects are directly due to ionising radiation.
Figure 2 The Optimisation Process
The standard picture to show how reference levels help reduce dose over time is reproduced below.
Figure 3 The role of RLs in the optimisation process
The concept is that you set a reference level and then try to identify those people whose predicted dose is above that level and concentrate on measures to reduce their dose. This is expected to further reduce the doses to some of the people already below the reference level and the dose distribution shifts to the left. It is suggested that after time the reference level is reduced and further steps considered.
What this cosy picture misses is that each engineered reduction in the dose distribution, as opposed to reduction with time as the radioactivity decays or weathers, is accomplished by the imposition of another protective action or by a decontamination exercise that affect people who already experience low doses. Each these have costs; financial costs and lifestyle costs. How can we be sure it is worth it?
The Commission recommends including, where feasible, the views of all relevant stakeholders to decide the level of ambition to be achieved by selecting a given reference level. A laudable but difficult ambition.
The report has a long section (Section 3.2) on the need to understand the dose uptake of the public in the short, medium and long term which entails an understanding of the initial distribution of deposited radioactivity, the migration of radioactive material in the environment and food chains and the habits of people before and after the event. Understanding this, and the limitations of the results, is a major undertaking and requires specialist experience and knowledge.
The effort and resources required to triage the public to identify those that would benefit from medical treatment, decontamination or counselling might be significant (and the process may be a significant stressor of the population).
The report states that “Measurement data should be collected centrally and made available as soon as possible to all relevant organisations in charge of managing the early and intermediate phases in order to assist them in making decisions on protection. For the sake of accountability and transparency, the Commission recommends that this information should be shared with members of the public, accompanied by a clear explanation, while respecting the protection of personal information”.
In section 3.3, the report identifies that “Individuals who may be involved in the response to an accident are diverse in terms of their status: emergency teams (e.g. firefighters, police officers, medical personnel), workers (occupationally exposed or not), professionals and authorities, military personnel, and citizens who volunteer to help”.
The report suggests treating non-responders on-site in the same manner as the off-site population (shelter, evacuate and thyroid block) but “those who are involved in the early-phase response should be managed as responders, applying the principles of justification of decisions and optimisation of protection.
“The justification of decisions that may affect the exposure of responders should be taken in light of the status of the damaged installation and its possible evolution, as well as the expected benefits in terms of avoidance or reduction of offsite population exposures and contamination of the environment”.
“Overall, these decisions should aim to do more good than harm; in other words, they should ensure that the benefit for the individuals concerned and society as a whole is sufficient to compensate for the harm they may cause to the responders”
The report recognises that it may be hard to predict the doses to responders in situations where sources are out of control, particularly in the early stages where there is very little dose characterisation. It suggests that a reference level of 100 mSv may be appropriate for responders but “would be justified only under extreme circumstances”. Levels above this would be exceptional, reserved for life saving and to prevent further degradation of the facility.
This section is adequately covered by any organisation working within the REPPIR-19 regulations.
The report also suggests that those likely to be involved in the off-site response such as emergency services. Medical staff and bus drivers should be identified in advance and trained to appropriate levels of understanding.
Section 3.4.1 describes and justifies the early phase protective actions of shelter, evacuation and temporary relocation, thyroid blocking, decontamination of people, precautionary foodstuffs restrictions and those in the intermediate phase; temporary relocation, foodstuff management, management of other commodities, decontamination of the environment, management of business activities. It is a clear and competent description of the situation but does not add greatly to the body of knowledge.
Section 3.4.3 “The co-expertise process” is more interesting. It recommends a “process of co-operation between experts, professionals, and local stakeholders aims to share local knowledge and scientific expertise for the purpose of assessing and better understanding the radiological situation, developing protective actions to protect people and the environment, and improving living and working conditions”.
“From an ethical point of view, the co-expertise process focuses on the restoration and preservation of human dignity, which is one of the core values of the system of radiological protection (ICRP, 2018). More particularly, the process can be seen as reflecting inclusiveness, which is the procedural value behind the concept of stakeholder involvement. Beyond that, it allows the implementation of empathy (i.e. it provides the experts with opportunities to immerse themselves in and to reflect upon the experiences, perspectives, and contexts of others), which in turn helps find suitable and sustainable protective actions”.
Figure 4 Working with the community
The report suggests that being transparent about the monitoring programme, what is measured, why and what it means in terms of dose paths helps people by “taking into account radiological criteria and comparison with other situations of radiological exposure”.
This openness and discussion can then extend into the realm of identifying, implementing and managing protective actions with those directly affected feeling some ownership and understanding of the decision-making process rather than being on the receiving end of “expert” pronunciations.
“Protective actions implemented during the early and intermediate phases should be lifted, adapted, or complemented when authorities and stakeholders consider that these actions have achieved their expected effect, or when their continued application is no longer justified (i.e. cause more harm than good in the broadest sense)”. This is now known to be harder than expected and needs the coordination and support of various organisations and, of course, the public.
At high levels of residual contamination there may be difficult decisions to make about preventing populations returning to the area. A slightly gentler outcome would be to allow people back to collect valuables and precious materials but not to stay. Paragraph 175 discusses the conditions that might need to be mat before you allow people to live in a highly contaminated area.
The report (Section 4) suggests that the long-term phase has started when you’ve agreed that the facility is secured and decisions have been made about the long-term future of the area. At this stage the rehabilitation of the living and working conditions and the interaction of individual and community is complex. Management based on radiological principles and criteria was not sufficient to respond to the challenges.
“Experience has shown that large differences in levels of exposure may exist between neighbouring communities; within families in the same community; or even within the same family according to diet, lifestyle, and occupation. These differences generally result in a skewed dose distribution where a few individuals receive a larger exposure than the average”. This requires people in the area to be supported and informed of the factors that contribute to their radiation dose “not only to ensure adequate protection against the radiation, but also to guarantee sustainable living and working conditions, including respectable lifestyles and livelihoods”.
Section 4 covers the radiological characterisation in the long term and the protective actions that might be appropriate.
“The protective actions available for the long-term phase are many and varied, ranging from removing the contamination present in the environment (decontamination and waste management) to implementing collective and self-help protective actions to control external and internal exposures (management of food products, dietary advice)”.
“To restore individual well-being and the quality of community life in the affected areas where people are allowed to reside, there is a need to develop accompanying measures beyond the protective actions themselves. A first objective is to re-establish technical networks (water, electricity, telephone, etc.), infrastructure (roads, railway lines, etc.), and the services necessary for public life (schools, hospitals, post office, banks, shops, social activities, etc.). It is also important to ensure the overall socio-economic development of the territories concerned (establishment of industrial zones; support for the maintenance and establishment of agricultural, industrial, and commercial activities; etc.).”
“In the long-term phase, exposures of people, fauna, and flora are reduced gradually over time due to the combined effects of protective actions and natural processes. As a result, years after a nuclear accident (or even decades in the case of a severe accident), it is advisable to consider whether to maintain, modify, or terminate protective actions.”
Section 5 discusses preparedness planning for a large nuclear accident. It suggests that “For the long-term phase, preparedness aims to identify the societal, environmental, and economic vulnerabilities of potentially affected areas, and to develop guidelines that are sufficiently flexible to cope with whatever happens in reality”.
It further suggests that a prerequisite to preparedness is acknowledging the possibility that a nuclear accident could occur and seeking representation of all stakeholders in preparedness. I think that here the Commission should acknowledge that local, regional and national resilience teams have risk assessments that tell them that, that for example, floods and animal or human disease are far more likely and would be extremely disruptive and that that is where they should devote their preparedness resources rather than on extremely rare (we hope) severe nuclear accidents.
REPPIR-19 does require that severe accidents be considered, albeit in outline, and maybe tested occasionally. This will raise awareness within the responding organisations but is unlikely to push preparedness significant further forward with regard to interacting with an alarmed community.
“Practically, preparedness plans should contain a set of appropriate protective actions and arrangements for implementing them, including reference levels. Provisions for the deployment of necessary equipment for the characterisation of the radiological situation and the implementation of the co-expertise process should also be considered. In addition, specific communication schemes to inform the public and other stakeholders, as well as provisions for the training of those to be involved in the response, should be developed. These plans should be subject to regular exercises involving the various stakeholders”. This looks more like the detailed planning that is undertaken for what used to be called design basis accidents.
Importantly, and realistically, the report states that “The preparation of detailed plans for accident and post-accident management is a national responsibility”.If there were to be a severe accident the aftermath would involve difficult discussions. These would include discussions about which areas to abandon, which areas to allow to return to a controlled usage and which could be returned to normal. Further discussions would then be needed about how much decontamination to attempt and where (children’s playgrounds and schools, public areas, peoples’ gardens and homes?) and about how to avoid economic blight and stress.
The report concludes that “For this purpose, experts and professionals should adopt a prudent approach to manage exposures, seek to reduce inequities in exposures, take care of vulnerable groups, and respect the individual decisions of people while preserving their autonomy of choice. Experts and professionals should also share the information they possess while recognising their limits (transparency), deliberate and decide together with the affected people what actions to take (inclusiveness), and be able to justify them (accountability). The issue at stake is not to make people accept the risk, but to support them to make informed decisions about their protection and their life choices (i.e. respect their dignity)”. That sounds really difficult!
Central government should maybe look at this report closely and see what preparations might be appropriate against the very unlikely severe nuclear accident. The report suggests “for the long term phase, preparedness aims to identify the societal, environmental, and economic vulnerabilities of potentially affected areas, and to develop guidelines that are sufficiently flexible to cope with whatever happens in reality”. This appears to be suggesting applying the tools of Business Continuity Management and Business Disaster Recovery to communities.
Central Government may, for example, decide to have briefing materials ready to educate community influencers such as GPs, local council members, MPs, church leaders, media and teachers so that they can cascade knowledge and understanding and report back the views of the community. This might help kickstart the transparency and inclusiveness and reduce the stage at which the population loses trust in “experts”.
They may decide to produce guidance about what to do if homes, streets and schools are contaminated to a range of levels working out how to allow life as near as normal as possible. A world in which children cannot play in the open will never be a healthy and happy one.
There is no doubt that if such an accident happens we will wish that we had done more work preparing for it (or more work preventing it).
I think that this report by the National Audit Office (NAO) is quite worrying. It seems that the only thing we know about the defuelling and decommissioning of the AGR sites is that it will cost a lot of money; almost certainly more than has been put aside for the job.
The current agreement is that as soon as EDF declare a station off the bars permanently the costs of the site transfers to the decommissioning fund, EDF are paid to defuel the site and then ownership “of all land, assets and contracts required by Magnox Ltd to commence (commence not finish!) deconstruction on the sites” transfers to the NDA i.e. it seems that EDF can maybe choose to retain the assets they fancy.
EDF estimated that the fixed costs to manage and maintain a station that is not generating electricity but still holds fuel are around £140 million per station per year, compared with around £25 million to £35 million per station per year once the fuel has been removed. It does, of course, remain to be seen how realistic these values are.
The NDA will not know the exact details of what will transfer nor have a full understanding of the associated costs and liabilities until closer to the expected transfer. The long-term success of this scheme then depends on the ability of the NDA to deliver efficiencies from combining the AGR stations with the existing portfolio. Not that they have an unblemished history.
Since 2021 the NDA has adopted what it terms a rolling decommissioning strategy for its Magnox stations. This approach, it believes, could allow reactors to be decommissioned sooner. Stakeholders the NAO spoke to with technical expertise and knowledge of the AGR stations expressed differing views on the applicability of a rolling strategy to the AGR fleet.
I find it worrying that the way in which EDF, NDA and Magnox Ltd will work together to plan for transfer of the stations is set out in a Memorandum of Understanding because they could not agree the terms of a legally binding agreement. Meanwhile the Department is reliant on there being continuing goodwill between EDF and the NDA to resolve potential differences.
The UK government has yet to put in place arrangements by which it can assure itself that the Department is fulfilling these roles and the decommissioning programme is performing effectively.
Finally, what does the statement that it should be possible to save £1 billion in an estimated cost range of £3.1 billion to £8.0 billion mean? Surely you save £4.9 billion by hitting the lower estimate rather than the higher.
I watched the World Nuclear Association webinar about streamlining the licensing of Small Modular Reactors on July 28th. This was an interesting event with some good speakers. It is currently available on-line here.
The grumble behind the event is that, while companies want to sell their reactors around the world the pesky regulators in each country they want to build in want their say on the suitability of the design and this is tiresome, time consuming, expensive and may lead to country-specific design changes. The speakers made a good case that their jobs would be easier and that SMRs could start generating energy sooner if the regulatory barriers were at least lowered. We were also told that this is important for decarbonising the world energy market which is a relatively new way the SMR companies are trying to lean on Governments.
The audience was challenged by Tom Bergman, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, NuScale (a leading SMR design/build Company from the USA) with the question “Do you believe that a design approved in the USA is not fit for somewhere else?”. Maybe we could ask him if he would be happy for a British designed reactor, approved by the British regulators and built in Britain to be operated in his backyard without US inspection of the safety case, design, build and operation? We also heard from Sol Pedre, Manager of CAREM project, the National Atomic Energy Commission, Argentina (CAREM is a simplified PWR being built in Buenos Aires province) who, rather naively in my opinion, thought that if they could build and operate a reactor in Argentina then that should go a long way to convincing other regulators that the design is safe enough for worldwide deployment.
Nadezhda Salnikova, Head of Business Development Department of Afrikantov OKBM, JSC, ROSATOM (this is the company that designs and builds Russia’s nuclear propulsion projects such as submarines, icebreakers and floating nuclear power plant) commented that they produce plant for use within Russia under Russian regulatory supervision but the floating power stations can go anywhere. A lack of global licensing means extra work for the Company and work for the local regulators that may be beyond their capabilities.
It was suggested that new nuclear nations could simply accept the regulatory approval of the country selling the reactor. I suspect that this runs counter to IAEA expectations but might be acceptable if a floating plant was to be temporarily positioned following some crisis and operated by experienced staff. This is little different to a nuclear-powered submarine or ice breaker visiting a foreign port.
I have some sympathy for the potential loss of design stability caused by local requirements. This potentially makes the design chain and build more complex but we are talking about an industry that, according to the IAEA had more than 70 SMR designs running in 2020 (Ref. here) while NuScale have designed 50, 60 and 77 MWe versions of their reactor before building any. Design updates do not seem to be a particular problem. Meanwhile modern flexible manufacturing systems should enable slightly different builds to be accommodated on the production lines without reducing shareholder value too far.
The problem with attempts to produce global standards is that most countries agree with the concept providing that the world adopts their existing standards (hence my question to Tom Bergman above).
This event did not really explore the barriers to closer working of the regulators across the world and the advantages that might accrue from converging regulation. I would be interested to see a comparison of the regulators. What do they do in a similar fashion? what do they do differently? How much scope do their national laws and guidance give them to meet in the middle? Why would they want to do this? How much of the licensing effort is based on design and how much on siting, building and operating? Knowing this, we might then be in a better position to move partial streamlining of international licensing from an aspiration to a realistic target. (This information may be available in the WNA report “Design Maturity and Regulatory Expectations for Small Modular Reactors” which I haven’t yet read in full).
Small Modular Reactors are often based on evolutions of proven technology with enhanced levels of safety built in. Much of the additional safety comes from the small size and layout of the plant greatly reducing vulnerable pipework and reducing dependency on active systems for layers of safety. They have reduced the number of systems (valves, pumps, filters, tanks, chemicals, switches etc) that need to be considered. It seems logical to assume that their safety cases are simpler and fewer systems means fewer things to understand and approve. Design approval should be quicker.
Importantly the construction takes place in factories, possibly in a foreign country. What expectations will the regulator have for quality control and will they require to inspect the reactor during build?
If governments wish to see SMRs contributing to low carbon electricity, district heating, process heating and hydrogen production in the not-too-distant future then they do need to encourage regulators to do their bit to hasten the process without compromising safety. Generic Design Assessment (GDA), which takes about 4 years and is not mandatory, is far from the only issue. They also need to consider how the licensing of sites and operators will be undertaken if the market penetration talked about comes to pass.
What will the siting requirements be? Currently the UK process spends a lot of time and effort considering if a particular site is suitable for a reactor. That may be acceptable if you are only going to build one or two sites a decade but we cannot expect, for example, a foundry to spend years of effort to get permission to use a small (or even micro) reactor to melt metal. What siting processes do we need if, for example, six reactors are going to built and deployed each year?
In the UK the ONR has recently announced new guidance for parties requesting Generic Design Assessment of SMRs and AMRs (Advanced Modular Reactors). It would have been interesting to hear a discussion of this guidance, and the strategy behind it, to see if it goes someway to meeting the aspirations of the reactor manufacturers.
The UK 10 point plan calls for demonstrator SMR and AMR deployment in the early 2030s. But what is the strategy to deploy them, including siting them, in the following years?
I started listening to this webinar thinking about the issue of using one design of reactor in several different countries but ended up thinking that a more difficult issue (in the UK) may be that of gaining public and regulator acceptance of many more nuclear reactors doing a wider range of jobs requiring them to leave their large, well-protected sites, in the countryside with their hundreds of well qualified workers and instead sit in one corner of an industrial site or in the outskirts of a town and with a much smaller staff. This is a national, rather than an international, issue.
I’m grateful to the WNA for organising this webinar and for the speakers who gave their time. It is an interesting topic and was well presented. A good case was made that life for a reactor vendor would be easier if some of the regulatory barriers were streamlined. It was not made obvious that this was likely or even possible. The question in the webinar title was not answered.
This was an on-line event organised by Nuclear Engineering International bringing together a collection of speakers to provide updates on the development of, and potential for, small and advanced reactors.
The website opened with a picture of a conference centre with signs to various “places” which you could enter with a click. Entering the auditorium showed a timetable for the conference and allowed the user to listen to the current talk. After the event all presentations were available to listen to again. The Exhibition Hall allowed you to read or download publicity material and watch promo videos from a number of developers of SMRs. The Networking Lounge allowed you to read and join a number of text threads with representatives of the Companies involved.
This was a brave, and very welcome attempt, to recreate the functionality of a conference. It couldn’t provide the impromptu chats in the queue for a cup of tea, which are a vital part of conferences in the real world, nor recreate the sensation of sitting in an uncomfortable chair wishing the tea break was nearer while trying to concentrate on a talk. I admit to doing other things, such as catching up on shredding old documents, while listening to talks.
We live in an interesting time where there are limited funds for investment, a growing need for energy, a growing urgency to be more careful with the planet we call home and a lack of consensus on the way forward. Candidate solutions for the future include greater energy efficiency, reduced per-capita consumption, renewable energy solutions with solar and wind being the main growth areas, and more nuclear power. Within nuclear power there is competition between ever larger and more complex reactor systems, large but “simplified” reactors, and smaller reactor systems.
This conference was about the small reactors, seen by many as the solution to the “too big” problem with full sized reactor systems. One stated advantage are that smaller cores make less demand on the engineering of large pressure vessels and containment buildings. The control and safety systems can be bought closer, even into the pressure vessel, and a greater reliance can be put on passive accident management systems. But the unique selling point is the contention that these reactors can be produced, either as a number of modules or complete, in factories, shipped to site by road, plugged in and they are off. This considerably reduces the construction risks and build time resulting in a quicker achievement of a positive cash flow. The reactors are less powerful but it is easy to line up multiple reactors to give higher outputs while the smaller output makes them suitable in areas that cannot be served by 1000+ MW units.
It was explained that the UK SMR reuses existing design and technology but the innovation is chiefly working out how to factory build it. The system is “low cost, deliverable and investable” with 80% of UK content. The next step, which starts this year, is GDA. This is important for the UK context but is also a badge of honour around the world. The ambitious plan for acceleration includes parallel identification and development of the site and the placing orders before the GDA is complete. It is suggested that they might fit well on NDA sites which have a nuclear history but are not big enough for gigawatt plant such as Trawsfynydd. After the first of kind a factory might be expected to produce two systems a year. If orders were to be higher then further factories could be built. In this manner the 5th unit should be 20 – 30% cheaper than first, down to about £50 kW.
Funding is in place for the GDA phase but not beyond. The company is lobbying for the UK policy situation to develop and sites to be identified. The company is confident that once production is underway then debt and equity vehicles will be sufficient to move them forward but government bridging funds may be needed to get there.
This was an upbeat talk but the reality is that they are playing in a crowded field and the UK has a poor record of being able to deliver fleet savings in nuclear build (except maybe in the nuclear submarine world where the figures are less well publicised) and has, for years, lacked a suitably forward looking and coherent energy policy. They are also competing with Russians and Canadians with a more obvious local market and a clearer path to that market and the Chinese with their very large investments in a range of nuclear technology. Too much depends on the UK government.
The IAEA has set up an International Technical Working Group on Small and Medium-Sized or Modular Reactors (SMR) with a number of sub-groups enabling international collaboration in the development of SMR and their applications. They have produced a booklet reviewing 72 designs, developed technology roadmaps for SMR deployment, generic user’s requirements and criteria and a tool for the economic appraisal. Interestingly (for me anyway) they have a project running looking at the emergency planning requirements for SMRs due to report in December of this year. (See IAEA material at https://www.iaea.org/topics/small-modular-reactors). The fact that there are 72 designs on offer shows up a problem. It is relatively cheap and sexy to design a reactor system and many organisations do this hoping to get a slice of future markets. Most fall out of the race and represent a waste of effort.
Rosatom claim to have “SMR solutions in Russia and for the global market”. They are developing and building small reactors for icebreakers, for floating power plant and for land based systems. Floating power plant are expected to be used in the North, replacing diesel, coal and old nuclear generators and providing heat and electricity. Because they are built in a shipyard they need very little local building and are floated away at end of life rather than decommissioned in-situ. They can also be repositioned mid-life if required. Their newer reactor designs are more compact.
By using these reactors in icebreakers (4 vessels each with 2 reactors) they have already achieved significant fleet savings (that pun was not intended). They also have identified markets, home and foreign, for the floating and land-based variants.
It appears that Russia has a very credible SMR programme with proven designs and proven markets.
We were told about “The Progress of HTR-PM in China”. This is a high temperature gas cooled reactor with ceramic coated fuel (TRISO particles, pebble bed format) and helium coolant. The programme has a long history including the reactors HTR-10 & HTR-PM and extensive engineering laboratory work. Almost all of the components are built in China. Unusually they have two reactors in parallel providing steam to a single turbine. Each reactor can provide 250 MW.th and 210 MW.e with cores 3m diameter x 11m high. Inlet 250 oC out 750 oC producing superheated steam. HTR-PM is currently in hot-testing with first criticality expected this year.
They now have proven technology and have plans to move forward. HTR-PM600 (650MW) will have six reactors feeding one turbine. These will be used for co-generation and to repower coal power stations. An aspiration is to go to higher temperatures for hydrogen production.
Some ideas on financing SMRs and Advanced Reactors were presented. The poor track record of on-time completion, very high capital requirements and long times before return have given the industry a bad name and mean that nuclear is often a “bet-the-company” investment. Contract for difference and Regulated Asset Base are two attempts to manage the high cost of money in big build public interest projects.
It was suggested that SMRs significantly reduce all of the finance and risk problems of big-nuclear. They should be able to complete on programme, capital demands are lower, lead times are shorter, costs of delays are less and costs are such that they are not bet-the-company investments. Therefore they can be treated as conventional assets.
SMRs are like aircraft in many respects. Both are built in factories, safety critical, and highly regulated and are deployed as a fleet. Interestingly it was claimed that an SMR requires a similar investment as an Airbus A-380 [I tried to verify this and found getting the numbers quite difficult but seems to be in the right ball park. The clearest cost estimate I found was a 12 unit NuScale (924 MWe) estimated to cost $2,850 per kWe giving costs of $2,633 Million (NuScale brochure) compared to $428 Million for an Airbus A380 (one unit not 12) https://247wallst.com/aerospace-defense/2015/12/26/how-much-does-an-airbus-a380-cost/ ). As for large aircraft it is conceivable that SMRs could be sold on a Sale and Leaseback in which the lessee pays purchase price in instalments over a set period of time before becoming owners. The payments are treated as expenses rather than capital investment and the utility doesn’t have the liability for the plant on its books. An alternative is an operating lease in which the Lessor pays only rent and not pay-down of the capital costs, making it more affordable and viable in areas that could not afford nuclear power under current arrangements. It is hard to see a factory owner or a community buying one of these for cash to provide their energy needs over the next 20 years but they might lease one if it gives them reliable low-cost energy. It is noted that if the SMR is mobile (for example floating) it can be moved mid-life and follow the money.
There were a series of shorter presentations within chaired panel discussions. These provided a number of viewpoints.
Micro-reactors (up to about 10 MWe) are in various stages of development and licensing with some hoping to be building first of a kind systems in the next few years. Russia and China are further along the development line.
They use a range of technologies; some use components from existing larger reactors or the aviation industry, some use more novel components such as heat tubes to remove the heat. All of these reactors are designed to be accident tolerant, they can be used to produce heat or electricity and some are combined with molten salt energy stores to balance supply and demand.
It was claimed that the NuScale Advanced Small Reactor with 12 (or 4 or 6) 77 MWe units would have a site fence emergency planning zone (I’ll wait to see the ONR judgement on that!) and no radioactive release in normal operation, events or decommissioning.
A joint study which shows small nuclear being cost-competitive was cited (https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_51110/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity-2020-edition?details=true). A representative of the WNA put forward the view that the world should concentrate its efforts into a smaller number of design concepts (I agree) and that international harmonisation of reactor design approval was required (not very likely in my opinion).
All of the speakers agreed that the demand for electricity will rise, outstripping the capacity of renewables, as it is increasingly used for transport and domestic heating while the burning of hydrocarbons becomes less acceptable. (Estonia has an additional issue in that its grid connections to Russia are expected to be cut in 2025 and they want to move away from dirty shale gas that they currently burn).
The initial target market is remote communities with a need for district heating and electricity although industrial uses, mining, disaster response, hospitals, campuses, military bases, data centres, desalination, and hydrogen production were all mentioned as potential users.
A question about competition from solar power/wind power and batteries was dodged. But a later speaker stated that small grids with wind and solar would benefit from a nuclear component providing reliable generation and also the “spinning metal” required to control frequency and voltage and also reported an ability to black start (without grid supplies) some micro-reactors.
Interestingly all speakers were more fluent when discussing the potential market than when discussing operators. If these reactors are to penetrate markets as single, remote units it will not on sites with 500+ nuclear skilled employees. Getting licensed to operate them will have to be no more difficult than getting licences to run industrial process plant or they will run into difficulty. Will the regulators accept local “semi-skilled” operators with remote technical support?
Canada’s action plan for SMR was the subject of a panel discussion. It introduced the Candu Users Group (COG) and its Small and Modular Reactor Group. Canada has a proud history in nuclear technology and now has a large industry of strategic importance. The action plan (www.Smrroadmap.ca) has 53 recommendations which have translated to 497 actions. This is a broad coalition of 210 partners.
The Canadians have identified three streams of effort; fast development of SMRs with the potential to replace coal generation (a requirement of Canada’s environmental policy), the development of advanced reactors for a variety of purposes including use of used fuel, and the development of very small SMRs (vSMR) to replace diesel in off-grid situations (remote communities and industrial sites).
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is readying itself for the SMR programme with recruitment, a regulatory framework and reports on the potential issues. Their aim is to ensure safety and social acceptance without putting barriers in the path of progress.
The coherence and comprehensiveness of the Canadian plan is impressive. If only the UK could do something along the same lines.
This was an interesting day and provided ample evidence that there is a market position for small and micro reactors, with small reactors feeding national grids, process heat and hydrogen production and micro reactors providing power to remote communities and industries. There seem to be no insurmountable technology issues. The issues will be development finance and public acceptability and then the costs of ownership. Canada and Russia have advantages from obvious domestic markets at the high cost end. China has the advantage of a diverse nuclear industry and seemingly no limit to development funds. The UK obviously has the technical ability in this area with its commercial nuclear industry and nuclear powered submarine programme but it lacks the niche markets, clear funding and national strategy. There will be more in the market for multiple players. The UK will have to work hard to get a slice of that market.
The remote conference was not without technical issues and the posing of questions by text during the talk couldn’t replicate post-talk discussions. But the presentations and Q&As were available to review after the event.
I am grateful to Nuclear Engineering International for organising this event and to the speakers for their efforts. Next time I’d prefer to attend in person but this was a very welcome interlude in a lockdown.
An interesting paper has been issued by the House of Lords, European Union Committee (10th Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63, Brexit: Energy Security). This looks at the potential impact of the UK leaving the EU on the supply of electricity and gas. It finds that we may lose some of the market efficiencies we enjoy as a member and may have to make political concessions to retain some benefits, may have a accept higher prices for using interconnectors, and may be in a poorer position in the event of a continent-wide energy shortage.
There is a big uncertainty about the influence the UK will have on European energy policy when outside the EU and further debate about how, if at all, this will affect us. This theme was summarised by the statement that “Brexit can have severe long term implications for UK’s energy security if economically rational outcomes are not sought by both sides”.
From the point of view of trading electricity the EU does not seem to be a very good option for a trading partner. The report looks at the experiences of Norway and Switzerland. The EU seems to want to impose its own rules, not just the current rules but all future ones. To use the Norway model would be to lack any say in the rule making but to be a member of the EFTA, which the UK has rejected. Switzerland sits at the centre of Europe and has 40 interconnectors between it and the EU. Despite this it does not have the ease of trading electricity with the EU. Meanwhile, we are told that, “a study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy concluded: “With or without the UK, the EU will be able to complete its market, to achieve its climate and energy targets with feasible readjustments, and to maintain supply security.”
On the energy security front, the committee worried that we would cease to benefit from “EU solidarity” so, if energy was in short supply the EU members would be more likely to share what was available between themselves rather than allow it across interconnectors to the UK. The report concluded that: “Post-Brexit, the UK may be more vulnerable to supply shortages in the event of extreme weather or unplanned generation outages. While we note the Minister’s confidence in future UK energy security, we urge the Government to set out the means by which it will work with the EU to anticipate and manage cross-continent supply shortages that will affect the UK”.
There is an important section on Euratom. It is stated that: “not only do nuclear power stations supply a significant amount of low-carbon electricity [20%], but the continuity of that supply helps balance less predictable renewable sources, providing further assistance to the UK in meeting its decarbonisation objectives”. I’m not sure that this is entirely true if you take it to mean that a nuclear reactor will immediately take up the load if the wind drops. Nuclear energy provides “baseload” supply. Nuclear power stations work best when providing a constant level of output – load following is possible but is not one of their strengths. What really balances the unpredictable renewable sources are the rapidly variable generators such as hydro, gas turbines and diesel units. Not all of these score highly on the decarbonisation test.
It seems widely agreed that leaving Euratom will have no effect on nuclear safety – that is covered by UK regulation and the ONR. However, without replacement of the controls on the import and export of nuclear material, including fuel, and the free movement of skilled workers becomes more difficult. Without at least some of the Nuclear Co-operation Agreements held by Euratom being replicated trade becomes harder.
ONR have been given the task of Safeguarding but have stated that “Establishing a system that seeks to replicate all aspects of the current Euratom regime by March 2019 is unlikely to be achievable. A system that seeks to meet our international reporting obligations, and which can then be further developed over time is a more realistic starting point and is what we are aiming to achieve by March 2019”
In summary. We are leaving a club that distinguishes between “them” and “us” and we don’t know how much difference being a “them” rather than an “us” will make to our relationship with the EU or its member states. The European energy markets are not necessarily going to be open to us in the transparent way they are now. This means that the price of energy flowing between the UK and EU becomes a political question as well as a market question. The market becomes less efficient. Our place in the queue when the whole of Europe is lacking energy also changes for the worst.
Britain should have an energy policy that ensure that our lights stay on. The role of the EU member nations in that policy must not be taken for granted.
The NDA have issued a statement on the estimated costs of decommissioning the parts of the UK nuclear industry that they are responsible for (here).
It shows total costs in the range £97 billion – £222 billion with a best estimate of £119 billion over 120 years. Discounted cost is put at £164 billion which is higher than the unadjusted cost because the NDA now use negative discounting rates as explaining in the supporting document from the Treasury (here) but more clearly in an Annex to the Annual Report (here).
The current value of £164 billion compares to £160.6 billion a year ago. This includes £1.3 billion being added to the estimated cost of completing the job. Inflation and changes to the discount rates being applied explains the rest of the increase.
So despite £3.243 billion being spent and an Annual Report talking of good progress the estimated cost to completion is more than it was at the start of the reporting period.
The Annual Report admits that £100 million was spent in compensation following the flawed contest for the Magnox contract.
It looks possible that the Korean company TEPCO will take a major stake in the Moorside project. This may involve junking the design and regulatory work already done on the UK AP1000 (Ref ONR Website) applying to build their own APR 1400 design. That may cause delays but they have a good record of building reactors.
Kepco was formed in 1951, has the brand statement “power with heart” and describes its main business as “Electric power, heat supply, telecommunications and gas supply” (Ref KEPCO website). According to Wikipedia it is just over 50% state owned.
Early news of TEPCO’s interest in Moorside was published in the Guardian in February 2017 (Ref) More recent news is reported in the FT in July 2017 (Ref). New investment is thought necessary as Toshiba is struggling to survive (Ref).
Korea has a very credible history in the nuclear industry (Ref). The APR1400 being built at Barakah in Abu Dhabi is reported to be 95% complete and receiving nuclear fuel (Ref). But the news that Korea is withdrawing from nuclear power at home (Ref) is a cause for concern.
A one page overview of the APR 1400 reactor can be found at Ref and a more detailed one at Ref. (See also Ref for a description of the APR+).
The first of these reactors, Shin Kori Unit 3, entered service in December 2016. Reports suggest that 7 further units are under construction and 4 more planned (Ref)) although the recent announcement of a plan to wind down domestic nuclear power (Ref) may have an impact on that programme.
The APR1400 is a 1450 MWe evolutionary PWR based on the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP) aspiring to provide both enhanced safety and economic competitiveness.
As shown in the circuit diagram below the reactor design has two steam generators but, unusually each of these has two reactor coolant pumps each feeding into a separate cold leg. The pressuriser, attached to one hot leg, and the steam generators are increased in size compared to previous models and the reactor outlet temperature has been dropped to cope better with transients.
From IAEA-CN-164-3S09
Leak before break technology has permitted the pipe restraint system to the simplified.
The Safety Injection System consists of four trains each with a safety injection tank and a safety injection pump. This system provides high pressure, low pressure and recirculation in one system. It injects directly into the Reactor Pressure Vessel to eliminate the potential for leakage from a damaged cold leg. The safety injection pumps are physically separated from each other reducing the probability of common mode failure in fires, sabotage or floods.
A steel lined, post tensioned concrete structure with a reinforced concrete internal layer provides containment, biological shielding and protection from external hazards. It contains the reactor, the reactor cooling circuits, the steam generators and the In-Containment Refuelling Water Storage Plant. The latter is a key safety feature providing cooling water in fault conditions and a large heat sink.
Interestingly the reactor is designed to be able to manage daily load following based on the Korean experience of demand of 100% output for 16 hours a day and 50% output for 4 hours a day with 2 hour power-ramps.
