IAEA Safety Report Series 93 – National training strategy

A Methodology for Establishing a National Strategy for Education and Training in Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety. IAEA Safety Report Series No. 93.

This document discusses how a country developing its nuclear capabilities should consider the needs for education and training to deliver a sufficient number of competent people in each discipline required giving the range of facilities and activities in the country. It recognises the potential need for various levels and fields of qualification including qualified expert, radiation protection officer, operator, health professional.

The guidance is stated as “describing good practices [which] represents expert opinion but does not constitute recommendations made on the basis of a consensus of Member States”.

It recommends a fairly standard training needs analysis methodology consisting of an assessment phase, a design phase, a develop and implement phase and an evaluation phase. As is usual these are arranged in a cycle to ensure the provision reacts to changes in needs and progress.

The assessment phase looks at the range of facilities in the country and the education and training requirements specified in the legal and regulatory framework, plus any requirements associated with professional qualifications.

The design phase lists the range of courses and their capacity required to meet the national needs and considers who is able to provide the training (including foreign expertise for those in the early phases of development). This can include existing universities and training colleges, national facilities and private providers.

The consideration of formal qualifications, overseen by suitable organisations, and experience leading to recognition by professional bodies is required to ensure proof of adequate knowledge and experience for some roles. This process will identify career routes and pipelines providing the required personnel.

The IAEA’s EduTA methodology is also mentioned as a way of focussing peer review on the nation’s educational and training system.

The meeting of the identified training needs may require capability development or the purchase of capability from other countries. Shortfalls in capability should be analysed and managed. Train the trainer (TTT) is mentioned as a powerful technique to develop capability.

The development and implementation of the programme requires that every identified education and training need should be matched with an appropriate methodology, such as attendance at a structured course, on the job training or distance learning and that opportunities to undertake such training are provided. These training services should be carefully specified and designed and delivered by suitable qualified and experience people.

The IAEA suggests that “the development and implementation of a national strategy for education and training will require government support and the long term commitment of all relevant stakeholders (e.g. regulatory body, governmental and other authorities and organizations in the field of radiation protection and safety, education and training providers, professional organizations). In this respect, the establishment of a high level steering committee of stakeholders will greatly facilitate the development of a policy document that outlines the rationales for the national strategy for education and training in radiation, transport and waste safety. The same committee could also oversee the development and implementation of the national strategy”. In fact, in countries with mature industries this organisation may not be needed. Legal requirements for professional qualifications for some roles, regulatory expectations of the training and experience of personnel and commercial drivers for a safe and competent workforce can achieve the same ends. Issues of supply and demand of skilled workers may occur if significant changes in the structure of the industry occur such as extensive new build programmes or decommissioning activities start.

Evaluation consists of continuous evaluation – the comparison of progress against programme, and long term evaluation of the overall efficiency and effectiveness of delivering the needs of the nuclear industry.

The remainder of the document is taken up with appendices giving examples.

It shows how the nation’s needs can be assessed by listing the facilities that use nuclear knowledge and assessing their needs for qualified people.

It provides example syllabi for courses for RPO in nuclear medicine.

It provides an appendix giving an overview of actions for establishing a National strategy for education and training in radiation, transport and waste safety. This provides a table detailing how 20 actions, distributed across 7 organisations in 5 phases leads to the outcome “The national education and training programme continues to be effective and up to date”.

I do wonder if the world really needs IAEA Safety Report Series 93. It is a fine piece of work but of limited imagination and limited application.

The Ionising Radiation (Basic Safety Standards) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2018, Regulation 4

 

The Ionising Radiation (Basic Safety Standards) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2018 [Ref. 1] came into force on the 8th May.

Regulation 4 is concerned with “land [that] is contaminated as a result of the after-effects of an emergency, past practice or past work activity and the level of exposure of members of the public to ionising radiation cannot be disregarded from a radiation protection point of view”.

This is a very important aspect of emergency planning as learning how to live with the increased levels of environmental contamination that would follow from a significant accidental release of radioactivity is vital to the recovery and well-being of the local community.

The regulation requires that an appropriate minister sets a reference level for the land.

The definition of “reference” level is now different in three important documents:

  • The regulations (note: regulation not guidance) defines a reference level as
    “the level of effective dose or equivalent dose above which optimisation of radiation protection for members of the public must be prioritised”
  • ICRP 103 [Ref. 2] has “In emergency or existing controllable exposure situations, this represents the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur, and below which optimisation of protection should be implemented. The chosen value for a reference level will depend upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure under consideration”
  • The EU BSS [Ref 3] has “reference level” means in an emergency exposure situation or in an existing exposure situation, the level of effective dose or equivalent dose or activity concentration above which it is judged inappropriate to allow exposures to occur as a result of that exposure situation, even though it is not a limit that may not be exceeded;”

It would be interesting to understand why those who framed the regulation felt that their definition was better than either the ICRP’s or EU BSS’s. What do the regulations mean by “prioritised”? Does it mean that the UK cannot budget any money for the schools, NHS, social care or road maintenance until the clean-up costs have been covered?

Paragraph 4 requires the appropriate minister to ensure that “appropriate arrangements are established for the on-going control of exposure of members of the public to ionising radiation, with the aim of establishing living conditions that can be considered as normal, including—

(a) the establishment of an infrastructure to support continuing self-help protective measures in the affected area, which may include the provision of information, advice and monitoring;

(b) remediation measures; and

(c) the delineation of the area.”

This must be in place “before the resumption of habitation, or economic or social activities, on the land”. We need to be careful that this does not lead to people being kept away from their homes and offices for longer than is necessary as this is known to add to the social and economic stresses of the situation. We also need to avoid hasty decisions about reference levels and area delineation and, in fact, these are likely to be very fluid in the days and weeks following a serious accidental release of radioactivity.

The establishment of support infrastructure is likely to be a moving target as things become clearer and the affected members of the public become better informed of the situation and its ramifications. To say it must be in place before the public move back seems wrong.

Another major concern is that “this regulation does not apply while any part of an emergency plan is in effect in relation to the land in accordance with [REPPIR 2001]”. It is, of course very difficult to define when an emergency plan closes. Most off-site plans make provision for Recovery Working Groups which morph into the leadership of the recovery phase of the response which, it is recognised, could last for several years. Arguably, since this is a “part of an emergency plan” it stalls the application of this regulation pretty much indefinitely.

We need to understand a few things, including:

  • At what level can exposure of members of the public to ionising radiation be disregarded from a radiation protection point of view?
  • What does “prioritised” mean in Regulation 4(5)?
  • How are we to understand the clause that this regulation requires the emergency plan to cease to be in effect before the regulation comes into effect?

In summary this regulation touches on an important and difficult aspect of emergency planning; that of how do we keep the public safe, informed, healthy and at ease in areas that have been contaminated with radioactive material. The regulations require that a government minister establishes areas that have been significantly affected and defines reference levels, infrastructure, information streams and remediation plans to support these aims in those areas. There can be no argument that this is the right level for these decisions to be made.

Whether this regulation provides the appropriate regulatory tool is questionable. Hopefully we will never find out.

References

  1. The Ionising Radiation (Basic Safety Standards) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2018, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/482/made.
  2. ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2-4). http://www.icrp.org/publication.asp?id=ICRP%20Publication%20103.
  1. Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013L0059.

Human Medicines (Amendment) Regulations 2018

The Human Medicines Regulations 2012 have been amended from the 1st April (Human Medicines (Amendment) Regulations 2018) to clarify the legal position of nuclear off-site plans that rely on the speedy distribution (or pre-distribution) of stable iodine tablets and provide advice to the public to take them. This is a useful step forward.

According to the explanatory note attached to the regulations “Regulation 12 amends Schedule 17 to the 2012 Regulations so that pharmacy medicines containing Potassium Iodide or Potassium Iodate can be supplied in the event of a radiation emergency by persons acting in accordance with an off-site emergency plan or by persons listed in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.”

My understanding of the situation is now that for fixed nuclear reactor sites: (Based on Sizewell off-site plan and Highland Council’s Highsafe submarine plan).

  • The Director of Public Health determines the areas that pre-distribution of stable iodine should take place in.
  • The tablets are distributed (“supplied”) by a body such as NHS England or Navy (now permitted under the revised regulation if the radiation emergency has occurred or an event has occurred that could reasonably be expected to lead to a nuclear emergency has occurred although the legality of pre-distribution could be clearer).
  • On the day the Operator (who is likely to be the first to know that there is a serious release of radioactivity) alerts the public and advises them to take the pre-distributed tablets, having prior authorisation from the Director of Public Health to do this.
  • If tablets are indicated beyond the pre-distribution range then “PHE would be responsible for coordinating the delivery of additional tablets and NHS England would be responsible for arranging distribution to the public”.

How best to respond to a nuclear emergency; shelter, evacuation or relocate?

See FT article here.

There are two quite separate themes going on here: evacuation and relocation. The former is about running away from an airborne plume and is an urgent action. The later is a longer term issue.

For prompt evacuation the debate is about what dose do you have to avert for it to be worth running. For an elderly or infirm person, where evacuation may cost their life, the averted dose would have to be well up in the range where deterministic effects kick in hard (but there is a added complication if their carers all want to run). For an infant, able to see evacuation as an adventure if the adults around them are not too visibly stressed and with longer for stochastic effects to hit, the trigger level of avertable dose is much lower. It is not easy to put numbers to these trigger levels, not easy to estimate avertable dose in the heat of the moment and not easy to reassure a population being hit with both radiation and media outpourings.  Decision makers are in a hard place!

For relocation, there is more time to take measurements, more time to talk to the people affected and more time to reach a decision. Still a hard place to be. The balance is between the disruption to people’s lives if they have to move permanently, particularly if they cannot recover their belongings and if the receiving population is negative in any way, and the worry about living in an area with elevated contamination levels. Experience shows that either way some of the people affected are going to need support for a long time to come.

There are no easy answers.

Brexit, Energy Security and the Nuclear Industry

An interesting paper has been issued by the House of Lords, European Union Committee (10th Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 63, Brexit: Energy Security). This looks at the potential impact of the UK leaving the EU on the supply of electricity and gas. It finds that we may lose some of the market efficiencies we enjoy as a member and may have to make political concessions to retain some benefits, may have a accept higher prices for using interconnectors, and may be in a poorer position in the event of a continent-wide energy shortage.

There is a big uncertainty about the influence the UK will have on European energy policy when outside the EU and further debate about how, if at all, this will affect us. This theme was summarised by the statement that “Brexit can have severe long term implications for UK’s energy security if economically rational outcomes are not sought by both sides”.

From the point of view of trading electricity the EU does not seem to be a very good option for a trading partner. The report looks at the experiences of Norway and Switzerland. The EU seems to want to impose its own rules, not just the current rules but all future ones. To use the Norway model would be to lack any say in the rule making but to be a member of the EFTA, which the UK has rejected. Switzerland sits at the centre of Europe and has 40 interconnectors between it and the EU. Despite this it does not have the ease of trading electricity with the EU. Meanwhile, we are told that, “a study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy concluded: “With or without the UK, the EU will be able to complete its market, to achieve its climate and energy targets with feasible readjustments, and to maintain supply security.”

On the energy security front, the committee worried that we would cease to benefit from “EU solidarity” so, if energy was in short supply the EU members would be more likely to share what was available between themselves rather than allow it across interconnectors to the UK. The report concluded that: “Post-Brexit, the UK may be more vulnerable to supply shortages in the event of extreme weather or unplanned generation outages. While we note the Minister’s confidence in future UK energy security, we urge the Government to set out the means by which it will work with the EU to anticipate and manage cross-continent supply shortages that will affect the UK”.

There is an important section on Euratom. It is stated that: “not only do nuclear power stations supply a significant amount of low-carbon electricity [20%], but the continuity of that supply helps balance less predictable renewable sources, providing further assistance to the UK in meeting its decarbonisation objectives”. I’m not sure that this is entirely true if you take it to mean that a nuclear reactor will immediately take up the load if the wind drops. Nuclear energy provides “baseload” supply. Nuclear power stations work best when providing a constant level of output – load following is possible but is not one of their strengths. What really balances the unpredictable renewable sources are the rapidly variable generators such as hydro, gas turbines and diesel units. Not all of these score highly on the decarbonisation test.

It seems widely agreed that leaving Euratom will have no effect on nuclear safety – that is covered by UK regulation and the ONR. However, without replacement of the controls on the import and export of nuclear material, including fuel, and the free movement of skilled workers becomes more difficult. Without at least some of the Nuclear Co-operation Agreements held by Euratom being replicated trade becomes harder.

ONR have been given the task of Safeguarding but have stated that “Establishing a system that seeks to replicate all aspects of the current Euratom regime by March 2019 is unlikely to be achievable. A system that seeks to meet our international reporting obligations, and which can then be further developed over time is a more realistic starting point and is what we are aiming to achieve by March 2019”

In summary. We are leaving a club that distinguishes between “them” and “us” and we don’t know how much difference being a “them” rather than an “us” will make to our relationship with the EU or its member states. The European energy markets are not necessarily going to be open to us in the transparent way they are now. This means that the price of energy flowing between the UK and EU becomes a political question as well as a market question. The market becomes less efficient. Our place in the queue when the whole of Europe is lacking energy also changes for the worst.

Britain should have an energy policy that ensure that our lights stay on. The role of the EU member nations in that policy must not be taken for granted.

The obscure definition of Control in UK Cabinet Office parlance

My understanding of the history of emergency planning in the UK nuclear industry was that we adopted the management tool we call “Command and Control” after the Piper Alpha accident. In that disaster a fatal fire on a North Sea rig was prolonged while the responders sought somebody with authority to stop pumps feeding the fire with gas from neighbouring fields.

Following this lesson we ensured that our emergency arrangements unambiguously identified one role on site who would have unquestioned authority over all resources and actions on site after an emergency had been declared and another who would have similar unquestioned authority over the rest of the Company in support of the emergency response. We then gave people in these roles suitable training and a letter of authorisation promising them the full retrospective support of the Management Board for any actions they initiate when in post in response to an emergency.

An important set of components of the emergency scheme ensured that the person in this role was as fully aware of the changing situation as could be achieved and provided with the full range of technical advice that might be needed (situational awareness) and that their instructions (in terms of strategic foci) were converted to actions (orders) and every effort was made to complete the actions and report back in the time allotted. In this way the crisis is managed.

For many years I’ve worked with the Cabinet Office definitions of Command and Control.

I’ve just been reading the output of a New Zealand ministerial review Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand and I was struck by the completeness and clarity of their definitions of command and control:

  • Command (authority within an agency) is executed vertically, and includes the internal ownership, administrative responsibility, and detailed supervision of an agency’s personnel, tasks, and resources. Command cannot normally be exercised outside an agency.
  • Control (authority across agencies) is executed horizontally, and is the authority to direct tasks to another agency, and to coordinate that agency’s actions so they are integrated with the wider response. Control authority is established in legislation or in an emergency plan. This is control to task a certain agency towards a certain outcome (achieve a managed evacuation for example). It is not control over the actual resource – personnel and vehicles.
  • Coordination: bringing together agencies and resources to ensure unified, consistent, and effective response. 

    Command and control assists with coordination by defining authority between and within agencies.

These definitions can be compared to the UK Cabinet Office definitions as given in Cabinet Office Glossary

  • Command and control – The exercise of vested authority through means of communications and the management of available assets and capabilities, in order to achieve defined objectives.

Note: Command and Control are not synonymous terms – see the separate glossary entries.

  • Command – The exercise of vested authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives.
  • Control – The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives.

Further research quickly yielded the US and UK Department of Defence definitions

US Department of Defence, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

  • Command and control — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
  • Command — The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
  • Control — Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.

MoD, Joint Concept Note 2/17 Future of Command and Control

  • Command – The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
  • Control – The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

UK doctrine for civilian multi-agency working is based on co-operation of the Emergency Services rather than the control of all relevant resources by a Commander from a selected service (see Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004). This is consistent through the JESIP programme and the development of the Joint Decision Model.

I get the impression that historically our definitions of Command and Control may have been fudged so that it could be claimed that the concept is at the heart of multiagency response when, in fact, it clearly isn’t. We exercise Command and Control (or at least Command) within our own company or service structures and coordination between companies and services. Generally it seems to work in emergencies. If that is accepted then we don’t need to mangle the definition of control and “The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives” can be replaced with something clearer. If we feel that command and control across all the responders is more likely to achieve success than coordination (I’m certainly not in a position to judge this) then we should move in that direction. Either way better definitions of these key terms would be helpful.

IAEA Publication: Knowledge Loss Risk Management in Nuclear Organisations

 

BEIS has issued a Ministerial Statement to both houses of Parliament (Commons and Lords) with regard to policy in the light of leaving euratom. It proposes a twofold approach of (1) “negotiations with the European Commission to seek a close association with Euratom and to include Euratom in any implementation period negotiated as part of our wider exit discussions”; and (2) “to put in place all the necessary measures to ensure that the UK could operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.”

IAEA Risk cover

It might do well to read a recent publication from IAEA Knowledge Loss Risk Management in Nuclear Organisations. This sees challenges resulting from an aging workforce, an industry that runs plant for several decades with different skill sets being required for design, build, operate and decommission stages leading to changing workforce and management. The long duration of nuclear projects also results in issues of technology obsolescence and the need for the introduction of new skills such as cyber security. In the UK we can add the risks posed by the free market “policy” that is resulting in a series of very different prototypes being built or proposed.

This is an issue that should concern BEIS because, of course, the average tenure of a civil servant in a particular influential post is very short compared to the nuclear project duration. They need to ensure that they maintain the knowledge, skills and systems to understand what the NDA, operators, ONR, the environment agencies have been tasked to do and how well or badly they are doing it.

The IAEA document seeks to increase awareness among nuclear organisation managers of the need for a strategic approach and actions plans to identify and manage the risks of individual and organisational knowledge loss.

The IAEA projections show the number of nuclear reactors operating in the world rising, with most of the growth in countries that already have a nuclear industry. Within this picture reactors are retiring and will take experienced resource to decommission them. An even greater cause of need for new recruits is expected to be the loss of skilled and experienced workers to retirement, internal transfer or promotion, or resignation. One scenario for the USA shows 19,000 new positions and 63,000 new hires by 2030.

The IAEA propose a Strategic Workforce Planning system that is composed of a cycle of Workforce Analytics, Workforce development, Execution and Metrics and Business Unit Planning.

They call for a “Coherent intervention by governments, industry, universities and R&D organisations” to provide a feed line of skilled and competent workers.

In the UK the NDA fund R&D in the area of nuclear decommissioning to meet its obligations under the Energy Act “to promote and, where necessary, carry out research in relation to its primary function of decommissioning” and “to ensure that there is a skilled workforce available to undertake the work of decommissioning” (NDA University and Research Strategy). Various universities offer nuclear power material to undergraduates and postgraduates (For example: Manchester, Bristol, Leeds, and Cambridge). These have different levels of direct links to the industry and it is not entirely clear that the situation can be called a “strategy” or described as “coherent” but it does (presumably) provide a feed of skilled (but not experienced) youngsters for the industry.

IAEA_Process

Figure 1 Knowledge devlopment from IAEA NG-T-6.11

Figure 1 shows the IAEA view of the relationship between workforce planning and knowledge management. Those new to the industry are likely to spend some working, learning and training before becoming independent competent workers and then some further time before achieving recognition as an expert in their field. The art of knowledge transfer management is to ensure that, where an expert leaves for any reason while their skills are still needed, a suitable replacement is ready to take the post.

On the industry side, workforce planning is required Site Licence Conditions 12 and 36 (below). This leads to systems which identify key skills, suitably qualified and experienced personnel and succession management.

 

Licence Condition 12:

Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons

1 The licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements to ensure that only suitably qualified and experienced persons perform any duties which may affect the safety of operations on the site or any other duties assigned by or under these conditions or any arrangements required under these conditions.

2 The aforesaid arrangements shall also provide for the appointment, in appropriate cases, of duly authorised persons to control and supervise operations which may affect plant safety.

3 The licensee shall submit to ONR for approval such part or parts of the aforesaid arrangements as ONR may specify.

4 The licensee shall ensure that once approved no alteration or amendment is made to the approved arrangements unless ONR has approved such alteration or amendment.

5 The licensee shall ensure that no person continues to act as a duly authorised person if, in the opinion of ONR, he is unfit to act in that capacity and ONR has notified the licensee to that effect.

 

 

Licence Condition 36:

Organisational capability

1 The licensee shall provide and maintain adequate financial and human resources to ensure the safe operation of the licensed site.

2 Without prejudice to the requirements of paragraph 1, the licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements to control any change to its organisational structure or resources which may affect safety.

3 The licensee shall submit to ONR for approval such part or parts of the aforesaid arrangements as ONR may specify.

4 The licensee shall ensure that once approved no alteration or amendment is made to the approved arrangements unless ONR has approved such alteration or amendment.

5 The aforesaid arrangements shall provide for the classification of changes to the organisational structure or resources according to their safety significance. The arrangements shall include a requirement for the provision of adequate documentation to justify the safety of any proposed change and shall where appropriate provide for the submission of such documentation to ONR.

6 The licensee shall if so directed by ONR halt the change to its organisational structure or resources and the licensee shall not recommence such change without the consent of ONR.

The IAEA recommend a knowledge management team and define a list of participating roles and stakeholders for a typical nuclear power plant and the team’s main functions. It then outlines an Organisational Competence Loss Risk Assessment methodology. Among other tools this suggest a risk matrix which lists the skills requirements in each area and maps who, within the organisation, has those skills. This leads to the identification of those areas at risk of knowledge loss and the development of an Action Plan to restore the situation.

Another tool assesses the skills and knowledge of any employee nearing retirement, promotion or otherwise likely to leave their current post and initiates an Action Plan if appropriate.

The remainder of the document provides tools, forms, guidance and case studies.

 

REPPIR 2018 delayed?

The SRP tell me that “BEIS has advised that it is its intention to publish the Government response to the REPPIR consultation and the draft REPPIR regulations in late Spring 2018 with a view to laying the regulations before Parliament in Autumn 2018”.

I thought that the new regulations had to be in place in February of this year but didn’t think they were anywhere near enough to completion.

I can’t yet find a BEIS press release on the subject.

Space For Smarter Government Programme – Showcase 2017

SSGP ShowcaseI attended the Space for Smarter Government Programme (SSGP) Showcase in November 2017 in the BEIS Conference Centre in London. The slides from last year’s event can be found on the SSPG website (here). We can expect similar publication of this event in due course.

The stated purpose of SSGP is “Enabling the public sector to save money, innovate and make more effective policy decisions by using space technology and data”. The premise being that the capabilities offered by space science including Earth Observation and Communications offers the ability to deliver some current programmes of work more efficiently and to deliver capabilities that were previously unavailable. The progress made is hampered by the lack of understanding by the potential customers of the abilities available and the lack of understanding of the needs of the customers on the part of those developing the technology. This showcase is one of the attempts to get the two sides to communicate more effectively and drive forward better and more cost effective government services. The term used was “willing partnership”.

A number of projects were showcased. These included

  • improving the management of peat lands and thereby improving water quality and lowering costs in Scotland;
  • improving the monitoring of the health of forests;
  • Improving the monitoring of land usage, in particular which crops are being grown;
  • Improving the monitoring of flood water and areas at risk.

These projects relied on the ability of data analysis to look at how the signals from earth observation vary in relationship to what is on the ground and to calibrate it against relatively small scale land-based surveys. Once the system is calibrated it can cover very large areas quickly and provide a lot of information and/or help focus ground resources. This has resulted in significant savings in the costs of inspections while improving their coverage.

Earth observation can also highlight changes from period to period, allowing unexpected changes to be investigated on the ground.

The real prizes are gained when different datasets such as ground surveys or instruments, drones, helicopters and satellites are combined. Each adds different levels of resolution and area covered to give a big picture.

In the area of air quality there are significant improvements in the data sets available. This includes improvements in the resolution and repeat period (numbers quoted were moving from a resolution of 20 km squares to 7 km squares and a repeat frequency from once a day to hourly). The speed at which data can be released for analysis is also improving – down to three hours in one example quoted.

We also heard of studies

  • looking at the reusability of applications in an effort to improve uptake. A project which proactively looks (looked?) at applications in use or development and considered other uses of the output within government departments.
  • The development of a “digital twin” for infrastructure aiming to optimise maintenance and replacement programmes by improving the knowledge of the state of infrastructure and the loads on it.
  • The use of satellite data and communications to help monitor the conditions of the NDA’s estate which is widely distributed and in some relatively inaccessible locations.
  • A team dedicated to forming a bridge between the developers and potential users by being aware of developments and capabilities and trawling government departments seeking potential uses. Experience from this is that end users generally don’t always want to see complex maps or charts but want an answer to a question. The knack is to enable the providers to provide a service while insulating the end user from the technology and jargon.
RS&KIP
Keith Pearce (Katmal Limited) and Rick Short (NDA) at the SSGP workshop

It is worth noting that the software being developed is developed with the future in mind. The developers know that there will be more data and more varied data in the future. Some of this they can predict. Some of it, particularly further out in time, they can only guess at.

There was a session on the use of satellite data in an emergency and in the recovery stages. Data can show the near-current situation over a wide area and can show how it has changed since before the emergency. It can also enable secure digital communications with minimal and resilient ground equipment – although questions were asked about band width which can be an issued with multiple units in a small area.

There is a nice summary of the state of play of Environmental Earth Observation in the Houses of Parliament PostNote 566.

It seems clear that the use of satellite data has the potential to transform many services but is currently being hampered by a development and adoption barrier. The great strength of satellites is their wide area coverage and repeat rate. The weakness is that the information has to be extracted from vast amounts of digital data and, at least in the development phase, compared to ground truth surveys. The strength will go on growing as more satellites and more modern satellites provide ever more data. The weakness will diminish as experience increases; more applications will be developed and computers will become more capable of sifting the data and illuminating the interesting bits. Importantly, once an application works in, say, Hampshire it can be applied, with virtually no additional cost, in the Highlands of Scotland or, indeed, anywhere in the world. There is a great deal to be gained from getting over the development and adoption barrier, both for the functions of UK government and for future exports or foreign aid in kind. The Space for Smarter Government Programme is of great value and well worth support.SSPG

© Katmal Limited

Emergency Planning Society – Ripples workshop

I attended the Emergency Planning Society’s Human Aspects Group’s workshop entitled “The Ripple Effects of Major Incidents” in Cardiff on 16th November 2017. The speakers were people with first-hand experience of responding to support those affected by major incidents or of being caught up in them themselves.

This workshop was about the people affected by an event and the practical and emotional support they may need at the time of the incident and afterwards. They may need help coming to terms with their experiences and with their losses. This is a process that could take many years.

This was unusual territory for me. I used to be a responder at site or company strategic level in the nuclear industry where, in exercises, the news that a Reception Centre had been set up was a satisfying tick in a box that required no further thought. To be fair to us we had other things to keep us busy.

Why “Ripples”?

It is easy to underestimate the number of people affected in an incident. For example, in a terrorist event, there are the injured that need immediate care and some who will need continuing support to cope with “life changing injuries” – a highly sanitised term for some dreadful outcomes.

Beyond the physically injured are the witnesses. Those who experience things that most of us never will; traumatic things that can lead to severe mental scars that affect every aspect of life. People who, because of their experiences, are too scared to walk along the High Street or be in a public space. People who suffer repeated flash-backs and who feel survivor-guilt. People who can’t sleep well. These are life defining phobias and conditions. Children cannot access education, adults cannot cope in the workplace. This can result in a downward spiral of increasing anger, dependency and/or despair.

There are the families of the dead, families of the injured and families of the traumatised. All have their lives changed for the worst and have to come to terms with those changes.

There are people who narrowly avoided being a direct victim. People how didn’t catch that train for a trivial reason, people who didn’t go to that concert, people who live in the next tower block along (or indeed a tower block in a distant town or city).

There are the people who responded to the incident; professionals such as the police and medical personnel, but also the bystanders who come forward to give spontaneous help. Some of these will need emotional support to help them process their experiences.

There are the people who have lost their homes or their livelihoods, either permanently or temporarily, as a result of the event and need timely practical support.

Experiences of response

Some of the speakers reported their experience of responding in the first hours and days after serious incidents and explained the role of the Families Liaison Officer and charities.

In one event an apparent lack of coordination and leadership resulted in badly designed and managed survivor and community support which quickly resulted in anger and recrimination. Later improvements in the responders’ performance improved matters but, by then, a lot of damage had been done to the relationship between the community and the authorities.

Another report of a different response was more positive. A difficult situation requiring a lot of rapid decisions, some of which stood the test of time whereas some didn’t. A lot of learning already revealed and more to come as the analysis progresses. Interestingly and encouragingly the speaker described their recovery plan as being based on the national guidance and broadly successful.

A stitch in time saves nine

A few themes emerged from the presentations and discussion.

The support on the ground for those immediately affected needs appropriate design and competent management. In the first few hours the care needed will be largely medical for a number of people and the immediate needs of comfort, shelter and sustenance for maybe more people.

Within hours to days those affected may need wider support. They may be separated from their cash, credit cards and their travel season tickets. Without immediate help they risk an escalation of consequence – jobs, or at least earnings, lost as they can’t get to work. Education disrupted for children who can’t get to school.

Loss of other documents, such as passports and identification, can quickly become a problem for some and, without the correct support and advice, they may struggle to hold their own.

Businesses may be suffering, particularly if they are based inside police cordons.

These problems can be solved. We heard from Victim Support and from the British Red Cross on the services they offer and their experiences with things that went well and things that took longer to get right. It is possible to mobilise quickly. There are individuals and organisations with experience in supporting affected communities. Each time they are called upon they can be expected to get better, if the conditions on the ground, resources and coordination allow.

A number of big questions were posed:

  • How do you identify the needs of those affected and break through established procedures and budgets to provide help in a timely manner?
  • What do you do if a Category 1 responder is failing to cope? (or indeed any component of the response?)
  • What do you do with gifts in kind (which can be in overwhelming quantities and of a wide range of suitability)?
  • How do you coordinate and get the best out of spontaneous volunteers?
  • How do you manage social media in a positive way?

Learning points:

  • Social media is both a blessing and a curse. We heard of social media platforms being set up by individuals or organisations that attempted to help those affected but which attracted advertisements from the likes of Funeral Directors and Claims Lawyers, abusive messages or were used by journalists as source material for unauthorised articles. But we also heard of the real value of enclosed systems that could be set up on platforms such as Yammer and had a debate about who should manage them for the years that they might be needed – currently the police manage some.
  • Mobile phones allow families and friends to reunite without support. This does mean that the facilities set up to help reunite families see a higher proportion of bad news to good compared to the expectations of some years ago.
  • Nurses trained in the SWAN end of life care techniques and the police Family Liaison Officers can provide emotional and practical support for the bereaved.
  • It takes planning, experience and considerable resources and skill to set up the ideal range of support facilities for those affected in different ways by an event. Getting it wrong can quickly lead to worsening experiences, anger and lasting harm for individuals and communities.
  • The media can intrude upon facilities for survivors and family and friends. They should be controlled but helped to get appropriate material for their needs.
  • It is important to gather and understand data on the types of people affected and their needs as these change with time and there are humanitarian and reputational drivers to keep the gap between needs/expectations and delivery small.
  • Mutual support groups within those affected can be very useful to some people trying to cope in the aftermath of trauma. The ability to discuss matters such as poor sleep, anxiety, and availability of therapy with similarly affected people can be very positive.
  • People displaced from their homes and temporarily settled elsewhere benefitted from a single facility where they could access a range of help (CAB, Banks, Social Services etc.) but also greatly benefited from the opportunity to meet and chat with their neighbours (photos of sofas and coffee tables in the middle of a Sports Hall).
  • It is important to try to work with social media rather than against it – In Manchester there was a social media campaign for a vigil in support of the victims and defiance of the perpetrators. Enabling this, and supporting other such moves, was seen to be very positive.
  • Support may be required for many years after the event and includes, in addition to individual support, such things as organising ceremonies on key anniversaries and organising permanent memorials, both of which require careful attention to the wishes of those affected – which may not all be the same.
  • Donations in kind and in cash can be overwhelming, can take considerable resources to manage and can lead to incriminations and anger if not done to everyone’s satisfaction.
  • There is a need for some kind of Advocacy Service for the survivors of terrorism to ensure that they get the support they require. This includes practical help to cope with physical injuries, help with the mental injuries, financial support and help to build a life and access education and work that takes survivors’ trauma into account. (In an ideal world this would not be needed because the background social support should be managing).

Closing remarks

There were two very moving first-hand reports from survivors of terrorists’ attacks. Both exhibited anger at the inadequacies of support they have been offered in the UK, which compares badly to some other countries, and which clearly let them both down badly.

Something is broken. Survivors are not getting the support they need. It is clearly of concern to the emergency planning community and we should not think that our job is done when the final police cordon is removed. We have some level of responsibility to ensure that those caught up in an emergency are cared for in an appropriate manner.

Dealing with urgent and continuing medical needs is the remit of the emergency services and National Health Service although organisations such as CitizenAid have identified a role for prepared bystanders. The setting up and managing facilities to cope with the practical needs of those affected within the first hours and days of the event is quite clearly, I think, part of an emergency response and within the remit of emergency planning. Guidance is clear about responsibilities.

However, it could be argued that the longer term care of people with severe physical injury, with psychological harm and permanently displaced from their homes is not within the emergency planning and response remit. The UK should be doing better in these areas but our role in making it happen is, as an organisation, probably limited to raising concerns with the authorities and, as individuals, calling to account those in authority and those with responsibility in these areas – if we could only identify them.

A few of the attendees were from Social Care and Health roles in local government. It is a pity that there was no senior representative from central government or from the mental health world as defining and solving the problem is probably beyond our pay grades and their views would have been valuable.

© Keith Pearce, 20/11/2017

K.I.Pearce asserts his right to be recognised as the author of this document.